Many federal states in India have recently taken steps to improve distribution and affordability of medicines across public hospitals for reducing high out-of-pocket (OOP) expenditure. West Bengal has introduced a Public-Private Partnership (PPP) scheme, Fair Price Medicine Shops (FPMS) within government hospitals in 2012, which offers high discounts on maximum retail price of the drugs. This model introduces the state as a facilitator, rather than provider or financer, of health care. This paper attempts to measure its impact on OOP expenditure (OOPE) of patients using propensity-score-matching technique on the data collected from primary survey among patients. The study finds that although for non-poor patients, the average OOPE has reduced significantly, the impact has been counter-productive for the poor patients, hinting that PPP intervention seems to work only for relatively better-off people, as the best alternative for the poorest remains to be free provision of drugs from the government. The difference in outcome lay in the fact that the nature of control groups differed between poor and non-poor patients. Those poor patients who did not visit FPMS received most of the medicines free (hence OOPE nearly zero), while for the non-poor patients not visiting FPMS bought the drugs from outside retail shops.
| INTRODUCTION
Access to medicine is defined as having medicines continuously available and affordable at public or private health facilities or medicine outlets that are within one hour's walk from the homes of the population. 1 According to WHO estimates, nearly a third of the world's population lacks access to the most basic essential medicines, while in the poorest parts of Africa and Asia this figure climbs to a half. 2 Additionally, in developing countries, pharmaceutical drugs now account for 30%
to 50% of total health care expenditure, compared with less than 15% in established market economies. 3 Although the access to essential medicines worldwide increased from covering roughly 2.4 billion to 4.3 billion between 1975 and 1999, 4 a closer look reveals that the overall number of those without access remained almost unchanged and that these people are primarily the poorest and the most marginalized. Limited access to professional health services and aggressive marketing of drugs on an unregulated market have increased wastage of scarce financial resources and hence incidence of poverty, particularly among those who are already poor. 5 Eventually, this trend of lack of access and high out-of-pocket expenditure (OOPE) on drugs leave the poor either to forego treatment (hence losing man days, productivity, and income), or to seek the same in private and/or unregulated drug market often leading to catastrophic medical expenditure (when medical expenditure for one illness episode is more than 40% of Annual Non-food expenditure of the family), pushing them to medical poverty trap. The issue of user charges for public services has opened up a greater debate since the introduction of its concept in World Bank. 6 While this was a common strategy for many developing countries entrenched into health policy reform at the background of macroeconomic structural adjustment, this has been thoroughly criticized for being extremely regressive in nature lacking pooling of risks. Although it is expected to offer cross subsidy from richer to poorer patients, often the impact of user charges on the poor has been insufficient to provide financial protection and hence it turned out to be regressive in many countries. 7, 8 The result might get worse, in the presence of high transaction costs particularly among the poor. 9 Geographically, the lack of access to essential medicines is especially severe and concentrated in Africa and India.
In fact, 38% of the people without access to essential medicines live in India, and 15% live in Africa. 4 India, known as the "global pharmacy of South," 10 has 65% population suffering from lack of access to medicine, primarily due to absence of sound public distribution facilities. 11 Studies identify that this deficiency in access to medicines has resulted in the highest share of OOPE on health care, arguably the most regressive kind of health finance option. 12 Using Consumer Expenditure Survey data from the National Sample Survey in India, Garg and Karan 13 estimates that purchase of drugs constituted 70% of the total OOPE on health, and approximately 32.5 million persons slipped below the poverty line in 1999 to 2000 due to this. The study by Dutta et al in 2014 14 revealed that in 2011 only 6% in in-patient department (IPD) and 10% in out-patient department patients in secondary public hospitals in West
Bengal received all the medicines free of cost from the hospital, primarily owing to the demand-supply mismatch and failure to estimate demand correctly.
Although lack of access to essential medicines had been a common problem faced by all Indian states, very few of them came up with specific policy to ensure easy availability and affordability of drugs, other than the over-arching framework of National Rural Health Mission for providing universal access to health care since 2004. Delhi (1992) and Tamil Nadu (1994) were the first two states introducing state-specific policies for ensuring better access to medicines through more leak-proof and strong monitoring systems. In the Tamil Nadu model, considered to be the benchmark model to provide free medicines to every patient visiting public health facilities, autonomous public sector body named Tamil Nadu Medical Services Corporation procures high quality generic medicines through a transparent bidding system, which is then supplied to public health facilities through a demand sensitive coordination. Bihar, Delhi, Madhya Pradesh, Kerala, and Rajasthan also came up with similar, although differentiated, models. 15 In 2011, Rajasthan followed the Tamil Nadu model by establishing Rajasthan Medical Services Corporation and introducing the Mukhyamantri Free Fund Scheme, and within 2 years, an overall improvement in access to health care, financial risk protection, and health system expansion was observed. 16 All these models succeeded to improve access to medicines at different degrees, although they required huge public investment in the gamut, which could be possible to undertake only in states with relatively healthy budgetary positions or with generous central grants. The large discounts offered on MRP by FPMS are a viable business strategy because it precisely passes on a part of the markups that it itself receives directly from the producer, thus bypassing a few intermediaries in the distribution chains. The reduced price, in no way, is a signal of lower quality, as campaigned vocally by a group with economic and/or political vested interests; rather, it stands for efficient distribution practice involving public and private agencies. On the other hand, FPMS does not guarantee to offer each generic at a price lower than all available branded alternatives of that generic. They aim to offer drugs at a reduced rate compared with the branded market leaders (fastest moving brands in that particular drug segment).
In the First Phase in 2012, 35 FPMS were established with discounts ranging from 48% to 67.25% on MRP, and by end of 2014, 94 FPMS (out of 116 planned) became functional. The FPMS were directed to stock 142 mandatory medicines. These medicines were allowed in the form of branded generic which is a new term coined in Indian pharmaceutical market, which essentially carries the brand names of the companies, but does not go through any specific marketing or promotional activities and expenditures. They are directly offered to retailers and hospitals, bypassing the longer chain of other intermediaries. Many often, this category of drugs is marketed in same name by a company as the usual branded category. These medicines are supplied in bulk primarily to hospitals and retail chains. An initial evaluation by Dutta and Bandyopadhyay 21 revealed that on the totality the program was successful in reducing OOPE among patients seeking treatment in public hospitals. However, the aim of this paper is to evaluate the possible differentiated impact of implementation of this PPP model on the poor and non-poor patients admitted in a few state-run hospitals in West Bengal and thus to locate if this kind of low-cost policy for the government can work to support the most vulnerable groups to curb the possibility of medical poverty trap.
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With the abovementioned objectives, the study utilizes primary data composed of patients' exit interviews collected through well-structured questionnaires for 1000 hospitalized patients at the IPD. Crucially, for each of these patients, the prescriptions were copied. To capture the total OOPE of hospitalization, the inpatients were interviewed just before their departure from the hospital after receiving the discharge certificate, so that data for the entire illness episode can be captured.
Out of the 94 hospitals, 24 were identified, where FPMSs were launched in the first phase. These hospitals were divided into three categories: good, bad, and medium performing in terms of total sales volume of FPMS in the month preceding the survey. Three hospitals were selected from each category ( Since the study design was explicitly quasi-experimental, our sample has two analysis groups: one treatment group and one control group. The treatment group consists of patients who had visited the FPMS to buy the medicines, and the control group is made up of those who did not visit FPMS, even if they went to other retail shops outside the hospital premises to buy medicines without any discount on MRP. Both treatment and control groups come from a group of 803 patients in IPD, who had the "need" of buying one or more medicine as they did not receive all medicines prescribed free of cost from the hospital pharmacy. Out of these 803 patients, who comprise the potential FPMS visitors, 446 are poor and the rest are non-poor. The main hypothesis that we test in this paper is that the program effect was successful to reduce the magnitude of OOPE for the treatment group compared with control group for both poor and non-poor patients equally. Simply comparing between the means of OOPE by treatment and control groups shows that the former's average expenditure is far higher (statistically significant) than the control group in case of both economic groups of patients (Table 1) . In order to correct for the possible sample bias of selfselection, we need to use certain methodology for culling out the effect of program.
We have used propensity score matching because of its effectiveness in simulating an experiment and measuring treatment impacts in non-experimental studies, especially only for studies observing the post-treatment effects, like this one. 23 In short, we first calculate the propensity of each individual to receive the treatment in the sample and Source: Analysis of primary data e560 DUTTA club one treated individual and one individual from control group with similar propensity to compare their outcome variable. This way, each treated person is compared with a non-treated person, and the average difference of the outcome variable is taken as average treatment effect on the treated. The main feature of the technique is that it is expected to remove the selection bias by balancing the sample on the characteristics that potentially determine the possibility of selection of patients into the treatment group. Balancing for selection bias (here it is self-selection because FPMS was available for all the patients) is done using a probit model, whose estimates are used to obtain the propensity scores for selection into the program 24 (Table 2) . Propensity scores are the predicted probabilities to estimate the probability of each case receiving the treatment (ie, going to FPMS or not). Once the scores have been generated, we have checked if the selection bias has been removed by performing bi-variate tests against the treatment variable on all the variables used to remove selection. Since the differences for treatment indicator are insignificant after balancing, we conclude that the selection bias had been successfully removed, and our subsequent models would be balanced. We also assess whether the "standardized bias"-the differences in means between treated and matched clone from the control group divided by the square root of the average of the sample variances of the two groups-was less than 25%. 25 We have used nearest neighbor matching technique. This is expected to capture the average treatment effect on the treated in terms of the outcome variable. At the patient level, nine variables were considered to capture their socio-economic characteristics. They are as follows: geographical location of the household (rural or urban), caste of the household (general or reserved), type of fuel used in the household (green or red), type of sanitation facility in the household (improved or non-improved), patient's years of education, and regular access to newspaper of the patient (no or yes). While the initial ones represent the household's social, economic, and living conditions, the last two stand for their human capital and awareness levels, respectively. Lastly, a few patients' health care characteristics are considered which directly pertain to his/her health seeking behavior and acuteness of the morbidity. Time needed to reach the hospital, length of stay (LOS) at the hospital (proxy for severity of the illness), and existence of earlier morbidity within a year prior to this episode are considered. Certain variables are transformed with functions to correct the skewness in data following ladder analysis in STATA 12.
3 | RESULTS Table 2 posits the breadth of the policy to bring the patients within the net of the FPMS program is around 64.51%
on the average, with non-poor visiting FPMS in far higher shares (difference being statistically significant). Although this rate of coverage is not actually unusually low, there is still large possibility of enhancing the coverage. Coming to the depth of services, the picture is varied: while around 16% of the patients did not buy any medicines, (although overwhelmingly most of the medicines were listed in the essential medicine list for FPMS), nearly one-fourth of patients visiting FPMS bought all medicines prescribed, representing quite a skewed nature of availability. There is some difference in buying no medicines across the poor and non-poor categories. Following the drive to induce the physicians to prescribe medicines in generic names, nearly 50% of the medicines prescribed were in generics, with non-poor patients getting significantly higher shares (Table 2) . Table 3 reports the results of the first-stage probit regression models, for poor and non-poor patients separately, which generate the propensity score of each patient to visit the FPMS. Poor patients appear to be visiting FPMS in less proportion in a few hospitals outside Kolkata, although there is no such specific tendency in hospitals situated in Kolkata. Non-poor patients, however, are far more inclined to visit FPMS in two teaching hospitals situated in the capital city of Kolkata. Non-poor cardiology patients visit FPMS significantly less, although, no department or type of illness control patients to visit FPMS for poorer patients. Share of medicines prescribed in generic forms and pre-existence of serious morbidity episodes in households increase the possibility of self-selecting non-poor patients into the program, while belonging to higher caste and access to newspaper both increase that possibility among the poor patients. Interestingly, the number of medicines needed to be bought (after receiving the free supply from hospitals) strongly determines the possibility of visiting FPMS by the poor people, while that is an insignificant determinant for the non-poor. Table 4 presents the summary statistics for patients visiting FPMS and those not visiting FPMS (even when they needed to buy medicines from outside) both before and after matching by nearest neighbor matching method. The results posit that most of the means of the indicators of un-matched controls were considerably different (using t test) from the corresponding means for patients visiting FPMS, but the difference vanishes after matching. This hints that a simple comparison of patients visiting and not visiting FPMS is likely to yield biased estimates of their association with economic outcomes, and we have been successful in reduction of sample bias between the treated and control groups.
The difference in outcome after matching would hence give us the effect of the treatment of the policy itself.
Additionally, estimates of mean bias reported in the last row of Table 4 are less than 15% in both cases of poor and non-poor patients, considerably less than the recommended 25% threshold. 27 Also, the common-support restriction does not lead to any significant loss of treated and control individuals (only one out of 446 poor patients and zero out of 357 non-poor patients were found out of the common support region). More than 90% controls in the set of poor households were used less than 4 times with 50% just once, while the corresponding figures for non-poor cases were 80% and 56%, thus representing existence of strong common support regions.
e562 DUTTA Using nearest neighbor matching methods, our results in Table 5 suggest that visit to FPMS is associated with a significantly lower OOP costs on medicines among non-poor patients in government hospitals in West Bengal relative to a set of closely matched control patients, who did opt out from taking any benefits of concessions on MRP.
However, the results are diametrically different for poor patients, for whom the impact of the program initiates a substantial rise in OOPE for medicine even after matching. Similar opposite results hold for total hospitalization cost among two groups of patients.
| DISCUSSION AND LESSONS LEARNT
The above analysis suggests that the overall impact of the new policy has been positive primarily for non-poor patients visiting public hospitals in West Bengal as the average OOPE has fallen for the treatment group, compared Source: Analysis of primary data.
e564 DUTTA with the control group. This essentially means that the new program has been successful in offering significant financial protection to the non-poor patients who received treatments in the government hospitals. It is true in spite of the fact that coverage and depth of the program appeared to be quite limited. However, the program could not reduce the OOPE among the poor patients, thus representing a partial failure. The prime reason behind this differential impact among the two income classes is that only those poor patients tend to visit the FPMS whose number of prescribed medicines is high, and the number received free from hospital is low (thus number of medicines to be bought from outside is high), while it is actually a weak determinant for the non-poor to visit the FPMS. Table 6 shows that within the poor, the treated and control groups had significant difference in receiving free medicines and medicines to be bought from market outside, although these differences are insignificant among the non-poor. Thus, the poor control group has lower number of medicines prescribed and also has low OOPE as they receive a larger number of prescribed medicines free of cost from the hospital, while the treatment group has higher number of medicines prescribed and has positive (even after huge discount on MRP) OOPE for most of the medicines.
On the other hand, the non-poor do not care much about the free medicines and visit FPMS only when they have higher number of medicines prescribed. Also, the poor buy lesser numbers of medicines from the FPMS (Table 2) A similar issue that needs special mention here is the fact that the patients for cardiology department appear to have low possibility of visiting FPMS. Survey on FPMS revealed that the majority of medicines and stents for cardiothoracic operations were available in the FPMS, which meant rational choice of patients for FPMS, given the fact that the treatment for cardiology is normally expensive. However, the otherwise result probably hints toward induced demand created by the doctors for buying these medicines and implants from outside stores and the authority needs to look into the matter more carefully.
Given this discussion, this exercise of evaluation offers several lessons to be learnt for the policy makers. This newer form of intervention uses the government agency primarily as a regulator and a facilitator, rather than simple financer or provider of health care. Although this emerges as a great option for the governments, especially those Statistical significance (5%) in differences between two consecutive rows of treated and control groups are shown by gray highlight.
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under severe fiscal constraint and with little fiscal space to scale up supply of free medicines, the policy appears to serve the non-poor far efficiently. For the poor, the option is always to get the medicines free of charge, rather than buying them from outside, even at a subsidized cost. Also, the doctors and other care providers seem to act as an imperfect agent of the government, as they often create a negative image of this scheme as compromise on quality and induce demand for drugs to be bought from outside (possibly out of vested interests). The poorest, most often illiterate and unaware, believe them as "life savers" and refrain from visiting FPMS, while non-poor can somehow avoid this serious inducement of demand. Thus, for those poor who did not receive most of the medicines free of cost from hospital, the policy could successfully improve the overall access to medicine, while for the non-poor it could protect against financial catastrophe. In this way, the policy had a differentiated impact on two groups of patients in terms of the cube of policy impact: for the poor, the breadth of coverage improved, and for the non-poor the depth of policy could successfully offer financial protection.
| CONCLUSION
Creating access to medicines is no doubt a crucial dimension of health policy in developing countries. The key challenge in reaching this developmental goal is paucity of public funds, coupled with inefficient allocation and usage of resources. Coexistence of multiple actors, including pharmaceutical industry, wholesalers, retailers, doctors, and medical representatives and their vested interests in different spheres make the problem even more difficult to handle.
The task might get easier if public policy can effectively harness the contributions of major actors in a more synergic framework. The private sector, by its very nature, seeks opportunities that can maximize its profits. In theory, this very sector can and should assist the public sector in identifying pathways that can progress toward the essential goal of access to medicines.
With titanic burden of public debt, the state of West Bengal has attempted to improve the access to medicines through an extremely innovative and cost-saving PPP policy initiative to effectively reduce the OOPE of patients.
The uniqueness of the policy has been absence of any public investment in large scale and the fact that benefits can accrue to patients not only of government hospitals, but also of private clinics. Public sector, usually held responsible for limiting open market competition, intelligently acts to enhance competition among pharmaceutical companies and retailers to improve the delivery chain.
After 3 years of introduction, the policy is found to offer financial protection primarily to the non-poor patients by reducing OOPE. However, this is true only for the relatively better-off patients, who visited FPMS whenever they had more medicines per prescriptions and they resisted the pressure of induced demand from the service providers.
For the poorer patients visiting FPMS, the OOPE on medicine, even bought under substantial discounts, were higher compared with those who did not. The latter group had low OOPE not because they bought the medicines from outside retail shops, but because they received them free of cost from hospital pharmacy. Hence, the program failed to provide financial protection, although they increased the access to medicines significantly. The difference in outcome lay in the fact that the nature of control groups differed between poor and non-poor patients. Those poor patients who did not visit FPMS received most of the medicines free (hence OOPE nearly zero), while for the non-poor patients not visiting FPMS bought the drugs from outside retail shops.
Saying this, it must be acknowledged when there are multiple policy interventions available (here free medicine from hospitals and reduced cost on FPMS), there are serious transaction costs for the patients, especially the poorest and the most vulnerable. Thus, who self-select into which policy would depend upon his involvement in other policy and the co-founded character between two or more policies make the weakest patients suffer in terms of financial protection.
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